Interest rate used for
discounting: Because of the 12-year time span of the
simulation, we needed to provide the asset managers with a
consistent language with which to evaluate and justify
alternatives. We applied a 6% discount rate to all earnings to
account for inflation.
Run time: In this analysis, we
sought to simulate the long-term investing of most institutional
investors. We chose 12 years in order to represent investments
longer then the average tenure of senior executives, and yet be
short enough to be realistic in terms of projection.
(Cycle length): Although not a
parameter to be set in Brightline, it merits description here.
Each year in a Brightline simulation is broken down into 24
two-week cycles (for a total of 288 cycles). In the simulation,
customers, companies and shareholders are given the option to make
decisions and changes in their business once every cycle. This
two-week time span for a cycle is intended to be short enough to
allow consumers and customers to react quickly to a changing
environment, yet be long enough to stabilize the potentially
frenetic movement of customers allowed by the speed of computer
modeling.
Customer Brand Loyalty: In every
industry there is a notion of loyalty to the brand, or reluctance
to change suppliers for whatever reasons. In the oil industry,
there are two main types of customers: industrial customers (large
corporations) and customers who pay at the pump. Brand loyalty at
the pump tends to be low, as customers can willingly and easily,
say, drive a block further to buy gas at 2 cents less per gallon.
We chose a 30% brand loyalty for this portion of the market.
Industrial customers are more reluctant or unable to change
suppliers than individuals. We estimated 80% brand loyalty for
them. We then estimated that 2/3 of industry revenues are
ultimately due to individuals and 1/3 to industrial customers.
Using these numbers to average the loyalty, we arrived at a 60%
overall brand loyalty which we used in the simulation.
Shareholder Reactivity:
Shareholder reactivity determines the likelihood that shareholders
of the Focus company will become "angry", and thus actively
involved in the management of a company, should certain conditions
in the Shareholder Anger Mode (described below) be met. This
parameter was not used in these analyses because, in the baseline
simulation, no shareholders were allowed to become actively
involved, and in the Focus company simulations, shareholders were
set to be active from the start.
Government Vigilance: Different
industries are more or less scrutinized by regulators, public
interest groups, and the general public eye. The Government
Vigilance parameter is intended to represent this scrutiny that
keeps companies in an industry from externalizing their costs
beyond reason. In Brightline, this parameter functions by
determining the probability that the government will fine a
company if it has exceeded the legal limit. We decided that a 60%
probability of fining, in each cycle, would best represent the
world environment within which the oil industry
operates.
Vigilance Mode: This parameter
determines how the government selects a company to fine, should it
choose to fine one in a given cycle. We have used what we call the
"weighted-exceed mode". In this mode, one company among those that
have exceeded the Legal Externalization Limit (described below) is
selected to be fined at a probability proportional to its
externalization over the legal limit in that cycle. Using this
setting, the company that is operating most illegally has the
highest probability of being fined, but all illegally operating
companies are vulnerable.
Brightline: Brightline is a
parameter which represents the "operating freedom" that a new
industry enjoys before they externalize their costs on the world
to an excessive level. It is in essence a period of time when
companies are operating within reasonable bounds on their own
accord, and are thus not moderated by the government or
shareholders. In the Brightline simulator, this parameter
functions by allowing a set "pool" of total externalization that
is allowed to an industry before the government is activated to
control externalization via fining. Because the oil industry is
quite mature and well monitored, we did not use this parameter in
our simulation.
Legal Externalization Limit:
This parameter is used to set the total "units" of externalization
that are allowed for a given company before they risk fining.
Although it will be described in more detail below (in Management
Aggressiveness), suffice it to say that a unit of externalization
is equal to a unit of competitiveness. The more a company
externalizes its costs, the lower the price of its product.
However, externalizing costs are placed on society (for example,
higher toxic gas emissions due to outdated equipment), and society
will only absorb a finite amount of "waste". This parameter
defines that limit which society (the government) determines is
allowable.
Cycle shareowners may become
active: This parameter allows us to keep shareowners of the
Focus company from becoming active shareholders for a specified
amount of time. For our baseline analysis, where no company was
allowed to have active shareholders, we set this to the 289th
cycle (after the simulation had already ended), to prevent
shareholders from activating. For our analyses with different
Focus companies, we set all shareowners to be active from the
beginning, so as to show the current potential of active
shareholders.
Number of votes needed for
shareowners to become active: Brightline assumes that there
are 5 significant shareowners in each company. If the company is a
Focus company, their shareholders have the potential to become
active, should the performance of a company fall below defined
standards (established in Shareholder Anger Mode, below). This
parameter defines the number of votes, out of 5, needed to
activate the shareowners and force the company into compliance
with the Legal Externalization Limit. This parameter was not
needed in our analyses.
Supplier Selection Mode: This
parameter determines how customers potentially choose a new
supplier (company) for their services. We used what we call a
"random mode". Using this mode, in each cycle, customers will look
at one other company, chosen at random, as a potential supplier.
If the price of their product is lower, and their Brand Loyalty
allows, they will move to the new company. If the other company's
price is higher, they will stay with their current company.
Consumers therefore do not survey the whole market place every two
weeks for a new supplier. Use of this mode in particular reflects
Brightline's roots as an agent-based, complexity theory model. A
former member of the SWARM programming team at the Santa Fe
Institute created the core simulation classes used in Brightline.
Experimentation with SWARM which suggests this approach to be more
realistic than a completely random mode.
Shareholder Anger Mode: This
parameter sets the conditions that make the shareholders angry,
thus involving them in the running of their company. We used a
mode that causes the shareholders to become angry if their
company's share price falls below ½ of the market leader's share
price.
Penalty Hold Time: This
parameter determines how long the effect of a fine imposed on a
company will last (fining will be described in more detail below
in Constraint Level). We estimated that in the oil industry, 6
months would best represent the real world. This estimation is
based on observations that results even as tragic as the Exxon
Valdez incident are real, but not long lasting in the public
market.
Constraint Mode: This parameter
gives a number of options for how a company is penalized when they
are fined. We selected a mode (mode 4) that holds the company's
externalization at a pre-defined level (to be defined in
Constraint Level, below).
Constraint Level: This parameter
defines the externalization limit at which a company is held for
the duration of the Penalty Hold Time if they are fined. This
parameter is only used if Constraint Mode is set to 4. We
estimated that in the oil industry, a 25% reduction in
competitiveness would be most appropriate. This estimate is based
on observations that companies can be hit fairly hard in the short
term for certain acts. Take for example Shell attempting to dump
the Brent Spar platform in the North Sea. Although this is not
illegal, Shell lost 20% of its market share in Germany in one
week. We set this parameter to 3, or 25% below the legal limit of
4.
Company Management
Aggressiveness: This parameter is the crux of the oil industry
analysis, and the data for which we are most indebted to Innovest.
This parameter sets the willingness of the management of each of
the 5 companies to externalize their costs. Recall that
externalizing costs makes a company more competitive in price, but
unloads the company's internal burdens on society. Therefore, the
more aggressive a company, the more they unload their costs on
society. We used the Innovest EcoValue 21 scores from their 2000
Global Integrated Oil and Gas Survey. We picked our 5 companies
based on their international presence and their broad range of
EcoValue scores. Dr. Whittaker was kind enough to provide us with
preliminary scores before the actual publication was released.
EcoValue scores go from best to worst as follows: AAA, AA, A, BBB,
BB, B, CCC. BP received an AAA, ExxonMobil an A, Total Fina a BBB,
Imperial a B, and Occidental a CCC. To these scores we attached
the following Management Aggressiveness numbers (significance to
be explained later). BP was a 20, ExxonMobil a 16, Total Fina a
14, Imperial a 12, and Occidental an 8. These numbers determine
the likelihood that a company will increase their externalization
in a given cycle. A 20 means that there is a 1 in 20 chance in
each cycle that a company will increase externalization. An 8
means that there is a 1 in 8 chance (more likely) that they will
increase, and so on in between.